South Sudan 2015 Peace Agreement

April 12, 2021 Uncategorized 0

The 15-member group called on the parties to comply with the permanent ceasefire without delay and expressed its readiness to consider appropriate measures to ensure full implementation without exception of the agreement and to remedy any violations or omissions of a party in the implementation of its provisions, including the imposition of an arms embargo and additional targeted sanctions. One of the most frustrating phenomena in the history of the conflict in South Sudan has been the unwillingness of the parties to the peace agreements to implement what they had agreed in good faith. Over the course of most years, agreements are partially, selective and deficient for obvious political reasons. It`s a potential obstacle. A recent example is Kiir`s announcement of the Republic Order Number 17 on September 27, 2018. The decree ordered the head of the South Sudanese armed forces, General Gabriel Jok Riak Makol, to release prisoners of war and prisoners, to stop training recruits and to stop revenge attacks or reprisals by ASA forces, as stipulated in Chapter 2 of the R-ARCSS with regard to the permanent ceasefire and transitional security agreements.2 More than 20 political prisoners have reportedly been released by the government, despite delays, including James Gadet Dak and William Endley3 – although some political activists (such as Peter Biar Ajak) have not yet been released.4 The full text of President S/PRST/2015/16`s statement is: African Union (2014) op. 27. IGAD (2015), op. Chapter VII (3), 49. Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2015), Op.

Quote., 6. Ibid., 7. The ARCSS amendment procedure under Chapter VIII (Article 4) provides that the agreement can only be amended by a majority of at least two-thirds of the Council of Ministers and at least two-thirds of the votes of the JMEC. Kiir strongly opposes it because he considers the regulation to be “truly neocolonialist” and confirms “the supremacy of the JMEC over the TGoNU and the national legislative branch.” Here, the SPLM/A-IG`s objections can be justified by the reality that a unilateral amendment to the ARCSS might be technically impossible, since the SPLM/A-IG – like the SPLM/A-IO – has only two of the 18 members who make up the JMEC quorum. The SPLM/A-IG has 16 ministers out of a total of 30 prescribed for the Council of Ministers in Chapter 1 (Article 10) of the ARCSS. The amendment procedure, involving two balanced institutions (in the form of composition and structure) in the form of the Council of Ministers and the JMEC, seems appropriate as a mechanism for monitoring and compensating unilateral changes by the ARCSS, motivated by political reasons. If there are well thought-out and progressive amendments, there is no doubt that the procedures provided will not be a stumbling block. This assertion, if examined in depth, would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the events leading up to the closure of the ARCSS could have largely undermined the ownership, buy-in and commitment of SPLM/A-IG and other targeted actors in the South Sudan peace process. His assurances of “total commitment” can be read as political rhetoric to an expected nation and hopeful regional peace mediators. What makes the peace equation even more complex are the perceptions and positions in Machar`s political camp. It is instructive to note that even the SPLM/A-IO of Machar had its own reservations about ARCSS: Ateny Wek Ateny, spokesman for the president, told the press conference that rebel forces were going to the hospital in the town of Bor and had massacred 126 out of 127 patients.